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Third World Quarterly (forthcoming) 
 
Rising Powers and Order Contestation: 
Disaggregating the Normative from the Representational 
 
Edward Newman and Benjamin Zala 
 
Abstract 
One of the central themes of the current literature on rising powers is that new 
aspirants to great power status pose a challenge to the underlying principles and 
norms that underpin the existing, Western-led order. However, in much of the 
literature, the nature and significance of rising powers for international order is 
imprecisely debated, in particular the concept and practice of ÔcontestationÕ. In this 
article we aim to establish a distinction between normative contestation and what can 
be thought of as Ôcontestation over representationÕ: that is, contestation over who is 
setting and overseeing the rules of the game rather than the content of the rules 
themselves and the kind of order that they underpin. This distinction is important for 
providing a more nuanced understanding of the nature of the current power transition 
and therefore for guiding attempts at accommodation on the part of the established 
powers. Theoretically, the paper engages with debates on international order and 
international society. Its empirical basis is provided by a thorough analysis of the 
discourse of rising power summitry, in particular at meetings of the BRICS and 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization groupings. 
 
One of the central themes running through the current literature on rising powers is that the 
new aspirants to great power status pose a challenge to the underlying principles and norms 
that underpin the existing, Western-led order. This often takes the form of a discussion about 
normative contestation that is assumed to be taking place and is likely to characterise the 
current era of order transition. According to this, Ôrising powers are not only contesting their 
position in the international system, but the very rules that govern their rise.Õ1 
 
However, we argue that there is ample evidence that rising powers Ð such as China, Russia 
and India Ð do not necessarily seek to resist or challenge the underlying principles of 
international order in all instances, but rather they seek to gain greater access to, and 
representation in, the institutions and processes which define, administer and uphold 
international rules. From this perspective, much of the political conflict that is associated with 
the transitional international order may be better be defined not as normative contestation but 
rather as Ôcontestation over representationÕ. This form of contestation reflects a demand by 
rising powers to have their material interests served through greater access to and 
representation in international regimes, but it is also a demand that respect and status are duly 
accorded to them. That is, contestation over who is setting and overseeing the rules of the 
game rather than the content of the rules themselves and the kind of order that they underpin. 
This distinction is important for providing a more nuanced understanding of the nature of the 
transition in power that currently defines international order. In pursuing this distinction, the 
paper seeks to address a number of questions: Is political conflict related to the transitional 
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international order fundamentally about contestation over norms, representation in regulatory 
regimes, or both? If it is normative, how can we disentangle this from conventional Ôgreat 
powerÕ rivalry around material, geopolitical interests? Where political conflict between 
existing and emerging Ôgreat powersÕ is characterized as normative contestation, what 
precisely are the norms at issue, and what is being contested? It is often remarked that the 
ÔemergingÕ and ÔrisingÕ powers do not represent a coherent normative community and that 
they are divided on many issues.2 Does this mean that contestation around the Ôrules of the 
gameÕ cannot be characterized as normative or taken seriously? Drawing upon the ÔEnglish 
SchoolÕ approach to International Relations, is it possible to distinguish between rising 
powers contesting the fundamental primary institutions of international society, and when 
they are challenging secondary institutions Ð such as the composition and operating 
principles of international organisations?3 
 
This paper examines the words and actions of rising Ð or resurgent Ð powers in order to 
explore whether and to what extent they are contesting certain norms associated with 
international order and traditionally championed by the established powers. The objective is 
to differentiate between forms of contestation in the context of a transitional international 
order. Moreover, accommodating rising powers and negotiating a peaceful power transition is 
both Ôexceptionally complicatedÕ4 and hugely important. Having an accurate understanding of 
the degree and nature of contestation between rising and established powers should be of 
interest and use to both scholars and practitioners alike. By paying particular attention to the 
discourse used in summits held by rising power groupings, the paper will attempt to clarify 
and add empirical depth to the debate around the sustainability or otherwise of the norms 
underpinning the current global order. Within a framework of International Relations 
scholarship which engages with contestation and international order, the empirical basis of 
this paper is provided by a thorough analysis of the discourse of rising power summitry. 
 
Rising Powers and the Assumption of Normative Contestation 
 
The Ôinternational orderÕ Ð as a coherent, unified set of practices Ð is a problematic idea. 
Nevertheless, it can be defined by the institutions which regulate international politics: the 
accepted rules, reflected in the behaviour of states and other actors. These primary 
institutions include fundamental norms related to state sovereignty, the rules governing the 
use of armed force, international law, and diplomatic practice, amongst others. Secondary 
institutions Ð such as multilateral arrangements Ð may be thought of as the means of 
managing international order. This order is often associated with the distribution or balance 
of material economic and military power, or the perception of such power, but it is 
importantly also a matter of norms which guide or proscribe action. It is broadly agreed 
(below) that the international norms and institutions which might be regarded as constituting 
international order are under transition and arguably under challenge. A changing 
international order might be a consequence of a sustained change in the perceived distribution 
of power, especially with a pattern of rising and falling powers that has an impact upon 
international norms. However, whilst it is relatively straightforward Ð but not uncontroversial 
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Ð to measure material changes in power and interests, the manner in which norms emerge, 
endure, or erode is more problematic. 
 
According to many analysts, the relative rise in power of a number of non-Western states has 
resulted in a process of normative contestation and resistance in international politics, and 
questions relating to the creation, internalisation and institutionalisation of norms are 
increasingly controversial.5 From this perspective, rising powers are not necessarily willing to 
be socialised into existing global institutions as passive Ônorm takersÕ, and various forms of 
normative resistance can be seen in a range of international policy areas.6 Connected to this, 
the manner in which decisions are taken and implemented in support of international norms is 
also increasingly fractious. 
 
Many ongoing international challenges occur against the background of this apparently 
changing international order, and appear to reflect a growing division between established, 
liberal states (such as the US, UK and France) and ÔrisingÕ powers, including China, Russia, 
India, Brazil, South Africa, Turkey and Indonesia. The manner in which this contestation is 
manifested often appears to reflect normative differences relating to Ð for example Ð the 
evolving nature of state sovereignty, human rights and humanitarian intervention, 
international criminal justice, development, and the use of force. 
 
Some analysts have suggested that this constitutes a post-hegemonic, post-unipolar, or post-
Western era, with significant challenges for the liberal international order.7 Others concede 
the relative decline of the US but argue that its soft and hard power will endure, will continue 
to transcend that of others, and it will continue to provide leadership and attract followers.8 
Some scholars claim that the liberal international order led by the US is resilient and that it 
will be able to co-opt rising powers into its norms and institutions, even without making 
substantial concessions to those states.9  Many scholars argue that the normative power of 
emerging states Ð and their power of attraction Ð is severely limited, exaggerated, and 
unlikely to present a credible alternative to existing institutions of world order.10 Their 
willingness and capacity to play a global leadership role is also questioned.11 Others argue 
that a Ôglobal grand bargainÕ between the existing great powers and rising non-Western states 
will be necessary in order to avoid military conflict.12  In turn, Kupchan envisages a new 
global order in which no single power or centre will dominate in material and ideological 
terms.13 Others suggest that the world faces a dangerous power vacuum which may last for 
decades, as the Western alliance declines and emerging powers are unable or unwilling to 
provide public goods.14 Yet, there is strong support for the idea that the material power of 
rising states has significant implications for the normative underpinning of international 
order, as a challenge to the ÔWestern domination of ideas and norms in international societyÕ, 
even if existing norms are not being rejected wholesale.15 
 
Despite these varied conceptions of the transitional global order, the notion that the rise of 
new powers Ôrepresents a profound challenge to both the structure of the international system 
and the normative foundations of international societyÕ16 has become widespread. Kahler has 
captured the general tone of this argument, suggesting that Ô[r]ising powers will aim to place 
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their imprint on reconstructed global institutions, and that stamp will differ markedly from a 
status quo supported by the incumbent powers.Õ17 In some cases this argument is expressed in 
terms of a general challenge to the contours of the existing order per se18 and in other cases 
this is conceived specifically as being a challenge to the liberal underpinnings of this order. 
The latter is captured by the recent prediction that Ô[a]s the so-called rising powers take up 
their positions as major players in the international system, alternative conceptions of order 
and governance will challenge established power structures and existing visions of liberal 
order.Õ19 Schweller and Pu have put this more pointedly and in a structural context in 
claiming that Ôa rising power must delegitimize the unipoleÕs global authority and order 
through discursive and cost-imposing practices of resistance that pave the way for the next 
phase of full-fledged balancing and global contestation.Õ20 Much debate focuses on whether 
the liberal or the Western-led international order has come to an end, and if we are entering a 
new phase. Yet these are not discrete or neat phases or models where one ends and another 
begins, and there can be multiple forms and understandings of international order operating in 
parallel. This debate, therefore, would benefit from a more precise analysis of the concept 
and practice of contestation as it relates to international order. 
 
Contestation in World Politics 
 
Despite its centrality to many understandings of world politics, contestation is a somewhat 
under defined concept in the International Relations scholarship. Finnemore has written that 
normative contestation is Ôin large part what politics is all about; it is about competing values 
and understandings of what is good, desirable, and appropriate in our collective communal 
life.Õ21 Yet the body of work that seeks to establish definitions and specifically to distinguish 
between different types of contestation is relatively small. 
 
In a recent article tracing debates in this literature, Wolff and Zimmermann have very few 
authors to choose from to explore the concept of contestation, all of whom have approached 
the topic from very different theoretical perspectives. Perhaps unsurprisingly, each 
approached the concept in ways that have little to unite them conceptually beyond a common 
purpose in tracking and highlighting empirically the contestation they see as already present, 
particularly in relation to global governance norms that are ignored by the mainstream liberal 
literature.22  
 
Elements of this relatively small literature do, however, attempt to categorise and define 
contestation to some degree. Wolff and Zimmerman, and Wiener, approach contestation as an 
interactive practice which reflects resistance but which can also generate adapted or modified 
norms.23 Contessi defines normative contestation as Ôan instance of strategic social 
construction that aims at undermining or displacing an accepted  or  emerging  intersubjective  
meaning  through  the formulation  by  actors  of  competing  discursive  interventions  that  
challenge the meaning of norms that embody conflictive interpretations of values.Õ24 This 
raises the definitional threshold relatively high in terms of requiring a direct challenge to the 
meaning of a norm but in so doing holds the promise of allowing for a greater level of 
analytical precision. It is this precision that is missing in much of the literature that presumes 
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that all rising powers, by virtue of their relative rise, will necessarily reject status quo 
conceptions of Ôappropriate behaviourÕ promoted by the established powers and the ethics 
that underpin them.    
 
Much of the work that focuses on the issue of legitimacy and its contestation by rising 
powers25 also conflates the rising power challenge to the (largely) Western dominance of 
international organisations and forums, and that which relates to challenging the deeper 
Ôcollective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity.Õ26 Only the latter refers 
to genuine normative contestation in relation to primary institutions. In other words, 
critiquing the existing order by virtue of the membership of its metaphorical Ôtop tableÕ is not 
the same as criticizing the content of the decisions made at that top table. Without 
questioning the special rights claimed by the great powers or the practice of Ôgreat power 
managementÕ itself, critiques of the Western-led order made by rising powers cannot be said 
to be necessarily normative in nature. Instead, contestation aimed only at highlighting the 
disproportionate role that Western states play in this regard should be characterised as 
representational. The latter tells us much more about the status aspirations of rising powers 
than it does about clashing worldviews or a fundamental breakdown in the Ôprimary 
institutionsÕ of international society.27 The critical distinction is, therefore, between 
contestation of substantive and procedural norms, or between primary and secondary 
institutions.28        
 
The conflation of normative and representational issues in much of the literature is of course 
partly explained by the way that they are tied together in some of the rhetoric of the rising 
powers themselves. As Hurrell warns us, this blurring of the distinction on the part of the 
rising powers between genuine normative contestation and efforts to increase their own 
representation in institutions Ð as a matter of prestige as well as interest Ð should not come as 
a surprise.29 Nevertheless, it is still important, analytically, to attempt to unravel and 
differentiate the two types of contestation and this is possible by looking at the actual 
discourse and actions of rising powers more closely from this perspective. To understand the 
nature of a power transition is to be able to assess the potential for conflict driven by 
underlying grievances and competing interests. This means that gaining a better appreciation 
of the types of contestation Ð normative, representational or something else Ð that are likely to 
characterise the continued period of order transition in the years ahead has become an 
important task. 
 
Rising Powers and Contestation: Normative or Representational? 
 
The section will explore the discourse of rising powers: how they individually and 
collectively define their place in the transitional order through elite discourse, in particular as 
it relates to the norms which underpin international order, and their policy objectives and 
demands. Surprisingly little attention is given to the discourse of rising powers Ð presumably 
because it is regarded as diplomatic camouflage intended for public consumption Ð but a 
close reading demonstrates some valuable insights into the aspirations of rising powers in 
relation to the evolving international order. For this reason, the speeches and statements 
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issued by rising and resurgent powers at forums such as the BRICS summits Ð despite an 
obvious element of propaganda Ð are a valuable source which should be taken seriously. This 
section draws upon a thorough analysis of the discourse of collective groupings or rising 
powers, and in particular the seven BRICS summits between 2009 and 2015. 
 
Some analysts point to the creation of alternative, including informal, multilateral institutions 
such as the BRICS grouping as being in and of themselves a form of contestation. Prantl, for 
example, has argued that informal institutions such as the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) and even the G20 Ôprovide a vital space to contest and to renegotiate the 
terms and conditions of US hegemony.Õ30 This makes the study of the discourse emanating 
from such alternative platforms a useful way of attempting to disaggregate the normative 
from the representational in the degree of contestation posed by the current assemblage of 
rising powers. Indeed, while a power is rising Ð when their material strength is still growing Ð 
discourse is arguably their most potent diplomatic ÔweaponÕ, and thus needs to be taken 
seriously. 
 
Representational Contestation 
 
The discourse of summitry points to a number of themes related to the norm of state 
sovereignty, global governance (in particular the management of international finance and 
trade), and development. Firstly, in terms of how rising powers Ð particularly within the 
BRICS group Ð project their collective presence in international relations, the 2013 Durban 
declaration provided an explicit statement of intent: 
 
We aim at progressively developing BRICS into a full-fledged mechanism of current 
and long-term coordination on a wide range of key issues of the world economy and 
politics. The prevailing global governance architecture is regulated by institutions 
which were conceived in circumstances when the international landscape in all its 
aspects was characterised by very different challenges and opportunities. As the 
global economy is being reshaped, we are committed to exploring new models and 
approaches towards more equitable development and inclusive global growth by 
emphasising complementarities and building on our respective economic strengths.31 
 
Russia has been particularly assertive about the systemic impact of the changing power 
balance and the implications this holds for international order. It conceived of the BRICS as 
Ôa symbol of a growing trend towards a multipolar world and the main driver of this trendÉ 
an important element of the global governance system in the 21st centuryÉ[and] an 
influential collective participant in global politics, with its own voice on some key issues of 
international peace and security.Õ32 The BRICS countries Ôare powerful states with a strategic 
prospect of development. They are leaders Ð the future leaders of the world and the global 
economyÕ.33 IndiaÕs prime minister similarly stated that BRICS Ôbrings together a group of 
nations on the parameter of Ôfuture potentialÕ.Õ34 
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There is an explicit objective of collective solidarity, as President Xi Xinping stated, 
involving Ôupholding the common interest of emerging markets and developing countriesÕ.35 
But this is clearly not inward-looking and it projects global aspirations: the BRICS wish to 
Ôbuild a partnership for world peaceÉ a new approach of common, comprehensive, 
cooperative and sustainable security.Õ 36 Similarly, going beyond economic cooperation 
amongst members of the group, under Russian leadership there has also been a specific 
objective to Ôfurther coordinate their foreign policies within BRICSÕ.37 
 
At the same time, the international order and the evolving balance of power is at the heart of 
the rising power vision, especially for Russia and China. This implies a direct challenge to 
existing hegemony. As Putin indicated, ÔAny attempts to create a model of international 
relations where all decisions are made within a single ÔpoleÕ are ineffective, malfunction 
regularly, and are ultimately set to fail.Õ38 At the same time, President Medvedev predicted 
that Ôa gradual transformation of BRICS into a fully-developed mechanism of interaction on 
major issues in global economy and politics could become our strategic goal.Õ39 
 
It is also important to note the soft power aspect of the BRICSÕ collective vision, because this 
underpins the desire to grow in influence with respect to broader normative and political 
goals. President Xi Jinping expressed this in terms of  increasing the moral appeal of BRICS 
countries: ÔAs advocates of fairness and justice, BRICS countries are committed to building a 
fair, just and beautiful world and represent positive energy in international relations. We need 
toÉuphold justice and equality in the world.Õ40 This is underpinned by considerable overseas 
development assistance and investment, particularly by China. 
 
In terms of the relationship between greater representation and normative objectives, much 
can be read into the stated desire expressed at the second BRIC summit Ôfor a multipolar, 
equitable and democratic world order, based on international law, equality, mutual respect, 
cooperation, coordinated action and collective decision-making of all States.Õ41 While the 
subtext of this is clear Ð it implies a resistance to a perceived erosion of state sovereignty Ð by 
framing this in terms of the desire to see a shift towards multipolarity, the normative 
argument is tied specifically to the representational one, that is, the lack of authority of rising 
powers in the institutions of global governance. This is underpinned by an assertiveness 
bolstered by material power: as the Indian Prime Minister noted, ÔBRICS has gained enough 
horizontal influence to compel the world to take notice.Õ 42 The Ufa declaration similarly 
expressed the Ôimportance they [BRICS] attach to the status and roleÕ of rising powers in 
international politics (italics added).43 
 
A recurring theme in BRICS summitry relates to international financial governance and the 
desire for reform in both the prevailing policies and the operating principles of international 
regimes. Yet this frustration is almost always tied closely to the manner in which decisions 
are made due to the constitutive nature of many of the global economic governance 
institutions, which challenges the legitimacy of these organizations Ð at least in their eyes. 
Voting rights and representation on international financial regimes has thus been a major 
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issue of contention. At the first BRIC summit Ð before South AfricaÕs membership in the 
group Ð President Hu Jintao stated: 
 
ÔA fair, just, inclusive and well-managed new international financial order serves as 
an institutional guarantee for sustained development of the world economy. It is 
consistent with the historical trend and meets the fundamental interests of all parties. 
We should work out programs to reform the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank and increase the representation and voice of developing countries so as to 
objectively reflect changes in the world economic pattern. We should improve the 
international financial regulatory regime and ensure that developing countries can 
effectively participate in the Financial Stability Board and other international financial 
regulatory bodies.Õ44 
 
There are, therefore, specific demands about the need to ÔimproveÕ the monetary system, 
strengthen the regulation of reserve currencies, and maintain stability in the exchange rates of 
major currencies, but this is couched in a broader narrative about equality.45 In the words of 
the Russian presidency, the existing governance of international finance is ÔunjustÕ in terms 
of its decision-making.46 Specifically the BRICS are collectively frustrated by the failure of 
the US to ratify the 2010 IMF reform package relating to quota resources and voting rights 
Ôwhich continues to undermine the credibility, legitimacy and effectiveness of the IMF.Õ 47 
 
ChinaÕs President Xi Jinping stated that ÔWe have stood for international equity, justice and 
greater democracy in international relations, spoken with one voice for the emerging markets 
and developing countriesÕ.48 Equity, justice and democracy relate here not to domestic rights 
for citizens, but rather to the demand from rising powers that their status be appropriately 
recognized and respected in international relations, something that they clearly believe 
Western powers seek to obstruct or even undermine.  
 
A further recurring theme in the discourse is that Ôthe global economic governance system 
must reflect the profound changes in the global economic landscape, and the representation 
and voice of emerging markets and developing countries should be increased.Õ49 In line with 
this, a fundamental theme of BRICS discourse has been the principle that, in issues of global 
governance, Ôall countries should enjoy due rights, equal opportunities and fair participation 
in global economic, financial and trade affairs.Õ50 The implication here is that existing 
regimes Ð in terms of the interests they represent and serve, and their operating procedures Ð 
do not allow fair participation. At the sixth BRICS summit the Fortaleza Declaration stated 
that: 
 
Ôinternational governance structures designed within a different power configuration 
show increasingly evident signs of losing legitimacy and effectiveness, as transitional 
and ad hoc arrangements become increasingly prevalent, often at the expense of 
multilateralism. We believe the BRICS are an important force for incremental change 
and reform of current institutions towards more representative and equitable 
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governance, capable of generating more inclusive global growth and fostering a 
stable, peaceful and prosperous world.Õ51 
 
Reform of international financial organizations is a pressing issue that goes beyond abstract 
principles; it is an objective to Ôenhance the stature and role of the BRICS countries in the 
global governance system, and help shape the international economic order in such a way that 
conforms to the historical trend of rising emerging markets and developing countries.Õ52 
According to this, the objectives of the World Bank will only be achieved Ôif the institution 
and its membership effectively move towards more democratic governance structures, 
strengthen the BankÕs financial capacity and explore innovative ways to enhance 
development financing and knowledge sharing while pursuing a strong client orientation that 
recognizes each countryÕs development needs.Õ53 A final recurring theme relates to internet 
governance, regarded amongst the rising powers as being dominated by Western countries 
and in particular the US. This, again, is couched as a call for Ôequal rightsÕ.54 
 
The discourse clearly sets out a powerful demand for the regimes of global governance to 
better reflect the evolving balance of power, in terms of control of the agenda and decision-
making. From this perspective, contestation over representation may be a better reflection of 
the significance of rising powers, with respect to secondary institutions of international order: 
a demand for greater access to, and power within, the collective management of international 
politics, and by extension greater prestige and due respect for status. Yet in challenging the 
primacy of established powers Ð in particular the US Ð the collective position of the BRICS, 
and in particular Russia and China, has systemic implications that seem to go beyond a 
simple demand for greater involvement in defining and implementing the rules of global 
governance. 
 
Normative Contestation 
 
The rhetoric that has emerged from rising power summits that squarely takes aim at the 
normative underpinnings of the current global order, while being less consistent than the 
theme of representational contestation, ranges across issues of development, peace and 
security and the centrality of state sovereignty.   
 
In terms of development, the 2012 Delhi declaration expressed a collective desire amongst 
rising powers for what is described as Ôresponsible macroeconomic and financial policiesÕ. 
This involves the avoidance of Ôexcessive global liquidityÕ and new structural reforms to 
mitigate the risks of large and volatile cross-border capital flows which hit emerging and 
developing economies most adversely. Greater stability in the supply and prices of primary 
commodities, and a reorientation of the World Bank away from a hierarchical North-South 
cooperation model to an equal partnership, are also demanded.55 Much of this is Ð at face 
value Ð at odds with the existing liberal, free-market orthodoxy which drives globalization 
under the supervision of powerful Western states. The Chinese PresidentÕs 2017 speech at the 
Davos meeting of financial leaders, for example, spoke of excessive and unregulated profit 
chasing: Ôwe should adapt to and guide economic globalization, cushion its negative impact, 
	 10	
and deliver its benefits to all countries and all nationsÕ.56 It comes closer to a contestation of 
primary institutions, but it is clearly not a challenge to the liberal order. Indeed, the Davos 
speech made a plea for the maintenance of an open global economy and warned against 
protectionism. 
 
On the management of peace and security, the discourse of the rising powers reflects a very 
clear collective desire to reinforce the traditional norm of state sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. As President Medvedev stated, this represents a collective commitment to the 
Ôclassical interpretation of international law principlesÕ.57 There is Ð at least in theory Ð 
consistent opposition to Ôunilateral military interventions and economic sanctionsÕ58 and a 
commitment to counter Ôattempts by individual countries to impose on the international 
community policies aimed at overthrowing ÔundesirableÕ regimes and to advance unilateral 
solutions to conflicts by means of sanctions and military forceÕ.59 As President Xi Jinping 
suggested, Ôthe use or threat of sanctions in international relations at every turn will not help 
solve problems. Dialogue and negotiation should play a useful part in settling differences 
peacefully and politically.Õ60 This reflects a deep aversion to externally driven regime change 
and a reassertion of the norms of territorial integrity and domestic jurisdiction. 
 
A defining illustration of rising powersÕ views on the maintenance of international security 
relates to the Syria case. China and Russia vetoed a number of UN Security Council 
resolutions on this case and a recurring theme of BRICS discourse is the need for respect for 
Ôthe independence, unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Syrian Arab Republic, in 
stark contrast to interventionist western approaches.Õ61 A similar sentiment has been 
expressed by the SCO membership.62 As Putin observed, Ôwithout RussiaÕs and ChinaÕs 
principled position on Syria in the Security Council the events in that country would have 
followed the Libyan and Iraqi scenario.Õ63 The BRICS narrative on international security 
reflects a consistent pluralist view of international order, emphasizing the important of 
sovereignty and the norm of non-interference, and assuming the legitimacy of state authority. 
The inherent conservatism of the rising powers is also illustrated in the context of the SCO, 
as expressed by President Xi Jinping: ÔThe SCO has the responsibility to prevent instability, 
forestall the spread of terrorist and religious extremist ideologies and stop forces with hidden 
agendas from undermining peace and stability in our region.Õ64 
 
The norm of state sovereignty is the bedrock of a number of collective aspirations of the 
rising powers. It implies a resistance to the liberal evolution of sovereignty, which attaches 
conditions upon territorial integrity related to human rights and governance. The rising power 
narrative therefore implies a resistance to liberal norms Ð seen as interference into domestic 
governance in non-Western countries Ð and the attachment of liberal norms to issues such as 
investment and trade. It also implies a desire for sovereign equality and respect in terms of 
the constitutive principles and rules of procedure of global governance. This does reflect 
genuine normative contestation, but not a challenge to the legal basis of international order on 
the part of rising powers. 
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This is similarly reflected in the SCO call for the establishment of a Ôa fair and democratic 
international order.Õ65 At the same time, the almost total absence of references to Ôhuman 
rightsÕ in SCO declarations illustrates the Westphalian and pluralist nature of cooperation by 
its members, and the assumption that rights are firmly in the ÔdomesticÕ sphere. This principle 
of Ôsovereign equalityÕ66 implies a greater role for rising powers in the UN and international 
financial organizations given their perceived domination by Western interests. It also 
involves a commitment by the BRICS to Ôcounter trends leading to the erosion of 
fundamental principles of international law and the arbitrary interpretation of the UN Charter 
and UN Security Council resolutionsÕ.67 Formal UN reform Ð something particularly pressing 
for India and Brazil, as aspiring permanent Security Council members Ð is a part of this 
agenda.68 
 
The discourse of the BRICS certainly appears to reflect a vision of a changing international 
order; there is no other way to interpret IndiaÕs vision of the BRICS as a Ôquest to forge a new 
paradigm of global relations and cooperationÕ.69 It is a vision which touches upon a wide 
range of policy areas Ð including the reform of international organizations, trade, 
development, peace and security Ð but it also reflects certain norms which are relevant to 
international politics, and in particular norms relevant to state sovereignty, exclusive 
domestic jurisdiction, and global governance. Does this narrative represent a challenge to the 
normative values which underpin international order? In fact, rather than challenging these 
norms, it reflects a pluralist adherence to Westphalian norms based upon sovereignty and a 
challenge to the liberal shift away from this conventional model of international politics. The 
idea of Ôrespect for diverse civilizationsÕ pushes back against the liberal internationalist 
project and is a deliberate signal of a desire for an international order that, at least in terms of 
politics, remains embedded in the norm of territorial integrity.70   
 
A compelling framework that can be explored in connection with the transitional 
international order is the distinction between the pluralist and the liberal worldview. The key 
question that follows is whether emerging powers reflect a pluralist challenge to Western 
liberal norms, aside from the challenge to Western attempts to Ôcontrol international politicsÕ. 
Here we do see evidence of normative contestation. In this scenario, pluralism reflects a 
commitment (in theory) to conventional Westphalian norms of non-intervention and respect 
for state sovereignty, and the idea that values and rights are essentially domestic matters 
within national communities. From this perspective, international order is served by 
multilateralism, diplomacy, respect for sovereign equality, and preferably underpinned by a 
balance of power and multipolarity. This is also underpinned by a statist worldview, and an 
emphasis upon non-interference and exclusive territorial integrity. According to this, there is 
no basis for making judgments about the legitimacy of national governments in relation to 
domestic issues Ð on development, human rights, or governance Ð apart from in the most 
exceptional circumstances, and state legitimacy is assumed. This position is most explicitly 
illustrated in political friction around human rights, the ÔResponsibility to ProtectÕ principle 
and democracy promotion, but the idea can also be seen in the position of some emerging 
powers towards development policy and international climate change policy. There is an 
informal solidarity amongst rising powers around this worldview, reflected in the absence of 
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criticism towards Russia in connection with its activities in eastern Ukraine. This pluralism 
contrasts with a liberal internationalist worldview which gives greater emphasis to universal 
human rights principles, democracy, and the international rules which govern state behavior, 
and has a contingent view of sovereignty. According to this, state sovereignty is increasingly 
conditional, and issues such as economic and political governance, and human rights, can no 
longer be legitimately regarded as exclusively domestic issues. 
 
From this point of view, normative contestation may be occurring even if rising powers are 
largely happy to participate in and abide by the rules of existing forms of global governance, 
since they are resisting certain liberal norms and asserting statist norms. As Stephen suggests, 
from this point of view Ôit is not the global governance order itself, but its most liberal 
features that are contested by rising powersÕ.71 As some scholars have observed, rising 
powers Ð for example the BRICS Ð do not share a common vision of world order.72 However, 
this sort of normative contestation does not necessarily require a coherent collective identity 
or agenda amongst rising powers. In other words, there is little evidence that the BRICS wish 
to overturn the existing international order Ð but this does not mean that they are not resisting 
or promoting fundamental normative ideas associated with the foundations and operation of 
this order. 
 
Cooley therefore sees this contestation as part of a deliberate effort on the part of 
conservative states to resist pressure to democratize and to reinforce the principle of 
sovereign jurisdiction: an Ôinternational backlash against liberal democracyÕ.73 For Ladi, this 
is not a coherent vision, but a Ôcoalition of sovereign state defendersÕ, resisting perceived 
incursions into the sovereignty norm brought by interdependence and interventionist political 
norms: Ôthe BRICS Ð even the democratic ones Ð fundamentally diverge from the liberal 
vision of Western countriesÕ.74 
 
From Rhetoric to Collective Action 
 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a substantive description of the collective 
policy initiatives and concrete action of rising powers, but even a brief survey demonstrates 
the systemic ambition and breadth of rising powers, and that some of the discourse has been 
translated into concrete action. It also demonstrates the evolution from economic 
coordination to a broader range of political cooperation.75  In terms of substantial action Ð and 
in particular interaction amongst themselves Ð few could deny that the BRICS collectively 
constitute a significant group with shared interests, as the 2015 Ufa plan of action suggests, 
involving meaningful joint initiatives in political, economic, trade, cultural, policing, health, 
agriculture, telecommunication, foreign policy, scientific, academic and economic policy 
areas.76 Such plans for future collaboration of course sit alongside the degree of success that 
the grouping has achieved in relation to increasing their Òshares and chairsÓ in the Bretton 
Woods institutions.77  
 
In the area of financial regulation and cooperation, the progress demonstrates the concrete 
nature of BRICS cooperation, but also the frustration of leading members towards the lack of 
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reform in existing economic infrastructure. Some of the new BRICS initiatives can therefore 
be seen as the establishment of parallel Ð or perhaps even competing Ð regimes. The New 
Development Bank and the Contingent Reserves Arrangement Ð with a total volume of $200 
billion Ð came into effect in 2015. This will fund joint large-scale projects in transport and 
energy infrastructure and in industrial development Ð thus providing an alternative to the 
Western-dominated World Bank and IMF. The BRICS Export Credit Agencies and the 
BRICS Interbank Cooperation Mechanism expand the BRICS countries financial cooperation 
and promote investment amongst BRICS members. The Strategy for the BRICS Economic 
Partnership Ð also established in 2015 Ð covers expanding trade and investment, 
manufacturing and minerals processing, energy, agricultural cooperation, science, technology 
and innovation, financial cooperation, connectivity and ICT cooperation between members.78 
This runs in parallel with the SCO ÔDevelopment Strategy Towards 2025Õ. As Cooper has 
demonstrated, the New Development Bank has real significance for a number of reasons, 
including its commitment to a principle of equality across its core membership, and its 
promotion of sustainable development through renewable energy projects, as well as its 
financial underpinning.79 The China-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
although not a BRICS initiative, also demonstrates how aspirations have been translated into 
reality in a way that has structural implications for international finance. The announcement 
of a plan to establish a BRICS Local Currency Bond Fund at the 2017 BRICS Summit in 
Xiamen only adds to the picture of the group moving well beyond a yearly photo opportunity 
for the leaders of the five countries. 	
 
Alongside the New Development Bank and the Interbank Cooperation Mechanism, the 
BRICS Business Council, the BRICS Business Forum, and the BRICS Think Tanks Council 
are involved in the implementation of this Strategy.  Moreover, a memorandum establishing 
the BRICS Network University was signed by the rectors of the 12 participating universities 
in 2016, and the Second General Conference of the BRICS Network University took place in 
Zhengzhou, China, in July 2017. The 2017 Xiamen summit also included the announcement 
of a new plan of cultural collaboration including the establishment of the BRICS Alliance of 
Libraries, Alliance of Museums, Alliance of Art Museums and National Galleries as well as 
an Alliance of Theatres for Children and Young People. The BRICS can no longer be 
dismissed as being merely a Ôtalking shopÕ.	
 
Conclusions 
 
From this study we can see that while there are some areas of genuine normative contestation, 
much of the rhetoric of the major meetings of the currently rising or resurgent powers is 
geared more towards contestation over representation than it is about contesting the actual 
norms that underpin the existing order. It is therefore generally the secondary institutions of 
international society which are being contested. A greater degree of conceptual clarity on the 
dynamics and systemic significance of normative contestation and closer attention to the 
actual claims made by groupings such as the BRICS demonstrates that there may be less that 
distinguishes the current power transition from previous power shifts than is implied by the 
focus on the ÔSouthernÕ identities of rising powers and the idea of a Ôpost-Western world.Õ 
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This may be due to the current group of rising powers having internalized, and directly 
benefitted from, the norms promoted by the established powers. Or it may be due to the 
institutions and norms associated with the contemporary order being less Western in nature 
than they might be traditionally thought to be. Yet no matter the cause, the implications for 
scholarship and policymaking alike are the same. The need for debates about the transitional 
international order to distinguish between normative and representational contestation is 
clear. 
 
While the degree of actual normative contestation differs across issue areas, and more 
research can and should be directed towards comparative studies across different domains 
with this in mind, it also emerges that certain rising powers appear more focused than others 
on normative rather than merely representational contestation. Similarly, following this path 
in future work and analyzing the different approaches that various rising powers are currently 
taking in contesting the existing order will be an important analytical task in the years ahead, 
especially as more far-flung contenders for rising power status beyond the BRICS countries 
slowly grow in status. This deeper engagement with the nature of contestation on the part of 
different rising powers across different issue areas opens up further theoretical space to 
disentangle norm internalization from socialization and both of these from compliance.80 
 
Is there consistency between discourse and action in terms of a pluralist conservative, 
challenge to the liberal international order? Or, more likely, is this about rising powers 
wanting greater control and participation of international rules and regimes Ð and respect Ð in 
light of their rising material power and status? In terms of peacefully negotiating the rise of 
new powers, the stakes are extremely high. Where there is genuine disagreement over the 
norms that should underpin the global order and where revisionist states do seek to challenge 
the Ôprimary institutionsÕ of international society,81 then finding avenues for peaceful 
accommodation will be extremely difficult. As one account notes, Ôthe problem of normative 
accommodation is, essentially, that the stronger the normative claims made by a state, the 
harder it is to see past these claims to understand the other sideÉÕ.82 But if, instead, much of 
the way that rising powers seek to contest the current order is actually motivated simply by 
aspirations for greater status (via a more authoritative role in global governance 
mechanisms), then the prospects for peaceful accommodation are much better. Ensuring that 
such opportunities are grasped will require a greater focus on distinguishing between 
different types of contestation when they occur. 
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